Gagne v. Bertran by Traynor, Roger J.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository




Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, Gagne v. Bertran 43 Cal.2d 481 (1954).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/417
I 
[L. A. No. 23098. In Bank. Oct. 19, 1954.] 
ALFRED GAGNE et aI., Respondents, v. BENJAMIN E. 
BERTRAN, Appellant. 
[1] Contracts-Subject Matter-Warranties.-While for historical 
reasons warranties have become identified primarily with 
transactions involving sale or furnishing of tangible chattels, 
they are not confined to such transactions. 
[2] Fraud-Knowledge of Falsity - Innocent Representations.-
Strict liability may be imposed for innocent misrepresentations 
of facts that maker purported to know, that recipient relied 
on in matters affecting his economic interests, and that maker 
positively affirmed under circumstances that justify conclusion 
that he assumed responsibility for their accuracy. 
[3] Contracts-Test Hole Driller-Warranties.-Test hole driller 
may not be held to strict liability of warrantor where there is 
no express warranty agreement, where there is no evidence 
to indicate that he assumed responsibility for his statements 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Fraud and Deceit, § 25; Am.Jur., Fraud and 
Deceit, § 115 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3, 4] Contracts, § 163a j [2, 5] Fraud, 
§18; [6) Fraud, §19; [7] Fraud, §9(3); (8) Fraud, §24; [11,10) 
Negligence, § 50; [11,12,14] Damages, § 54; [13] Damages, 130. 
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as to amount of fill on lots tcsted, where no absolute prolliiar. 
wnll Inlllie that fClmlta of hill test would be accurate, nnd where 
amount of his fee and fact that he was paid by the hour in-
dicates that he was selling service and not insurance. 
[4] Id.-Subject Matter-Services.-ln the absence of a war-
ranty. those who sell their services for guidance of others in 
their economic, financial and personal affairs are liablt' only 
on the basis of negligence or intentional misconduct. 
[6] Fraud-Knowledge of Falsity-Innocent Representations.-To 
be actionable deceit, representation need not be made with 
knowledge of actual falsity, but need only be assertion. as 
fact, of that which is not true, by one who has no reasonable 
ground for believing it to be true. (Civ. Code, § 1710. subd. 2.) 
[6] Id.-Intent.-Test hole driller's intent to induce prospective 
purchasers to alter their position can be inferrcd from fact 
that he made representations as to amount of fill on lots tested 
with knowledge that such purchasers would act in reliance on 
them. 
[7] Id.-Statements of Fact or OpiDion.-False statement by test 
hole driller to prospective purchaser, made after drilling holes 
and examining soil, that fill was only 12-16 inches in depth. was 
statement of fact and not mere expression of opinion. 
fS] Id. - Reliance on Representations. - Prospeetive purchasers 
had a right to rely on false statement by test hole driller as to 
amount of fill on lots tested where he held himself out as an 
expert, such purchasers hired him to supply information COD-
cerning matters of which they were ignorant, and hill un· 
equivocal statement necessarily implied that he knew facts 
tbat justified his statement. 
[9] Negligence-Oare by :£xperts.-Experts have a duty to exercise 
ordinary skill and competence of members of their profession, 
and failure to discharge such duty will subject them to liability 
for negligence. 
[10] Id.-Oare by Test Hole Driller.-Test hole driller's duty of 
care in performing soil test was established by his contract with 
prospective purchasers, and his failure to discharge such duty 
was shown by testimony of his employee that employee noticed 
evidence of fill 4-5 feet below surface, as well as by testimony 
of persons who dug foundation trenches, such testimony in-
dicating that had driller made his test with due care he would 
have discovered true extcnt of fill and would not have mnde 
false statement that flll was only 12-16 inehes in depth. 
[11] Damages-Measure-Torts.-In action by purchasers of realty 
against test hole driller for damages all resnlt of reliance ou 
[11] See Oal.Jur.2d, Damages, §§ 120, 156 et seq.; Am.Jur., Dam-
ages § 65 et seq. 
) 
I 
Oct. lU54J GAGNE V. BER'rRAN 
143 C.2d 481; 275 P.2d 15) 
48;$ 
driller's misrepresentation as to amount uf till on lots tested, 
difference bdween actual cost of installation of foundation ani! 
what it would have cost had driller's reprc;;clltations been 
true, while proper measure of damages if driller had under· 
taken to insure that lots had no fill beyond a certain depth. 
is not correct measure of damages where driller's undertaking 
was limited to due care to determine and report extent of till. 
and damages, whether for deceit or negligence, must be meas· 
ured by actual losses suffered because of misrepresentation. 
(Civ. Code. ~§ 1709. 3333.) 
[12] Id. - Measure - Torts.-In action by purchasers of realty 
against test hole driller for damages as result of reliance 
on driller's misrepresentation as to amount of fill on lots tested, 
if property was worth less than they paid for it, driller was 
liable for difference; but if lots were worth what purchasers 
paid for them, they were not damaged by their purchase. since 
even though they would not have bought lots had they known 
the truth, they nevertheless received property as valuable as 
that with whieh they parted. 
[13] Id.-Mitigation - Duty of Injured Party.-Although pur-
chasers of realty suing test hole driller for damages as result 
of reliance on driller's misrepresentation as to amount of till 
on lots tested had undertaken to build on property before 
they discovered extent of fill, they may not be required to 
terminate contract in order to mitigate damages where, at 
time they discovered the truth, they were so far committed to 
their building project that it would be unreasonable to re-
quire them to do so. 
[14] Id.-Measure-Torts.-In action by purchasers of realty 
against test hole driller for damages as result of reliance on 
driller's misrepresentation as to amount of fill on lots tested, 
costs incurred by them in installation of foundation which 
were not caused by driller's information, but were caused by 
physical condition of land, may not be recovered. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. J. A. Smith, Judge.· Reversed. 
Action for damages for breach of warranty, deceit and 
negligence. Judgment for plaintiffs reversed. 
Wallace & Cashin, W. W. Wallace and Earl A. Everett 
for Appellant. 
Nicolas Ferrara for Respondents. 
• Assigucd by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
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TRAYNOR, J.-The evidence in this case is in sharp 
conflict and is considered here in the light most favorable 
to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs had contracted to buy two unimproved 
lots for $8,500 "subject to ... a fill test to be made at buyer's 
expense." Plaintiff Joseph Billiet tele,honed defendant that 
he had a contract to buy the lots but "would not proceed 
with the deal unless we had a test made for fill, and I told 
him if he would like to do it, I would like to have him 
handle it because he handled my work before, so he said. 
e All right, I will take care of it.''' Billiet testified that 
between 1939 and 1942 defendant told him that it was his 
business to test soil for fill and that he employed defendant 
on four different occasions for that purpose. Defendant did 
not tell plaintiffs at any time that he was not a geologist 
or soil engineer or that plaintiff should get an engineer or 
city inspector to check the soil. Defendant fixed the price 
for his services at $10 per hour, which plaintiffs agreed to 
pay. On March 7, 1947, several days after this telephonr 
conversation, defendant sent two employees and a drilling 
rig to plaintiffs' lots. Several holes had been drilled when 
Billiet arrived at the lots; defendant arrived shortly there-
after. Billiet testified that he remained on the sidewalk 
near the street while defendant picked up and examineil 
samples of soil at each of the holes drilled. The location. 
depth, and number of holes to be drilled were entirely under 
the control of defendant. After defendant had examined 
samples of soil from each of the holes, he directed his em· 
ployees to close the holes and told Billiet that he had "nothin/! 
to worry about here. It is perfectly okay .... You may gn 
12 to 16 inches but that is about all .... You have got ;, 
normal condition here, for about an 18 inch foundation." 
Defendant's employee in charge of the drilling rig testified., 
however, tha:t he observed evidence of fill 4-5 feet deep in 
several of the holes, but did not inform either his employer 
or plaintiff of that fact. On March 17, 1947, in respolllw 
to defendant's invoice, plaintiffs mailed defendant a checl; 
for $25 for his services and requested a letter from defendant 
stating his "findings" because it might be required by F.R.A. 
Defendant replied that "On March 7, 1947 we drilled fivr 
16" dia. test holes . . . the holes were drilled to a depth of 
5'0 to 6'0 deep, we did not find any evidence of fill othf'r 
than on the snrface for about 12" to 16"." Defen(lant's 
invoice incltH1<'fl the printrd st.atement that amollg othrr things 
he did "test drilling." Billiet testified that in reliance on 
) 
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tlefl'ndalll's oral and writ 1('11 statements about 1 ht' extent of 
the fill they bought the lots for $8,500 and that they would 
not have bought them had they known that defendant's state-
ments were erroneous. 
After purchasing the lots, plaintiffs decided to erect a 
two-story apartment building thereon. They entered into 
contracts for the construction of the building and for a loan 
to finance the construction. Plaintiffs' contract for the in-
stallation of the foundation at a cost of $3,121.40 was based 
on defendant's report that there was no fill below 16 inches 
and was expressly subject to an additional charge in the 
event the contractor encountered "unforeseen conditions such 
as fill and extra work is required. . . ." As the first founda-
tion trench was being dug, it was discovered that the lots 
contained areas with 3 to 6 feet of fill. When notified by 
Billiet of this condition, defendant came to the site, looked 
at the trenches that had been dug, and stated that he had 
"evidently made a mistake." The depth of the fill required 
a much deeper foundation.! than defendant's report had led 
plaintiffs to expect. 
Plaintiffs brought this action to recover the increased cost 
of installing the foundation. Their complaint stated three 
alternative theories of recovery: (1) breach of warranty, 
~2) deceit, and (3) negligence. The trial court made find-
ings supporting a recovery on each of these theories. It 
found, among other things, that defendant held himself out 
as being qualified to make soil tests; that defendant repre-
~ented and warranted to plaintiffs that there was no fill 
':eyond 16 inches; that plaintiffs believed and acted in re-
iance on this representation and warranty, which was untrue; 
that defendant made his test for fill negligently and care-
Iessly; that defendant. had no reasonable grounds for be-
lieving his representation to be true; that the additional 
expenses plaintiffs incurred in the installation of the founda-
tion were proximately caused by defendant's warranty, mis-
representation, and negligence; that plaintiffs did not know 
the true depth of the fill until the foundation trenches were 
being dug, and that had they known the true depth of the 
fill, they would not have purchased the lots. Judgment was 
entered awarding plaintiffs $3,093.65, the increased cost of 
installing the foundation. Defendant appeals. He challenges 
'The 1.08 Angeles Municipal Code. section 91.4807. Table 48-A. requires 
the depth ot the foundation for a two-stOl')' building to be 18 inches belGW 
IIDdisturbed natural KroWld lurfaee. 
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I h(' sl1ffi(·j('lH·Y of IIl(' ('vi\lr'llI'P to support fb(' flnding-s of fad 
and ('ont (,tlfls I hat I h(' trial cOlIrt did not apply the proper 
measure of rlamag-es. We have concluded that these conten-
tions are, in part. well ~aken, and that the judgment must 
be reversed. 
THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY 
Plaintiffs contend that defendant unrlertoolt to guarantee 
the accuracy of the results of his test, not on the ground 
that there was an express warranty agreement, for there is 
no evidence of such an agreement, but on the ground that 
under the circumstances of this case the law imposes the 
strict liability of a warranty. 
[1] For historical reasons warranties have become iden-
tified primarily with transactions involving the sale or fur-
nishing of tangible chattels (see Prosser, Torts [1941], pp. I 
739-740; 1 Williston on Sales [rev. ed., 1948J, §§ 195-197), 
but they are not confined to such transactions.' [2] Strict 
liability has also been imposed for innocent misrepresentations 
of facts that the makf'r purported to know, that the recipient 
relied on in matters affecting his economic interests, and that 
the maker positively affirmed under circumstances that justify 
the conclusion that he assumed rf'sponsibility for their accu-
racy.a 
'One who acts as an agent warrants his authority to 80 act. (Rest., 
Agency, ~ 329; Civ. Code, ~ 2342); bailors and leasors warrant certain 
qualities of bailed and leased chattels (Kersten v. Young, 52 Cal.App.2d 
1, 6·7 [125 P.2d 501]; FUiher v. Pennington, 116 Cal.App. 248, 251 [2 
P.2d 518]; in certain cases a contractor warrants the soundness of his 
job (Kuitems v Covell, 104 Cal.App.2d 482, 484 [231 P.2d 552]); a 
shipowner warrants the seaworthiness of his vessel (Commercial Molasses 
Corp. v. New York Tank Barge Corp., 314 U.S. 104, 110 [62 S.Ct. Hi6, 
86 L.Ed. 89]; O. F. NelsO'7l 4' Co. v. United States, 149 F.2d 692. 694; 
The Arakan, 11 F.2d 791, 792); the owner of s building to be erected 
warrants the workability of the architect's plans that he furnishes to the 
contractor (Montrose Contracting Co. v. Westchester CO'Unty, 80 F.2d 
841, 842; Williston on Contracts [rev. edt 1938] § 1966 and cases cited; 
see also McConnell v. Corona City Water Co., 149 Cal. 60, 63 [85 P. 929. 
8 L.R.A.N .S. 1l71]); and those in the business of supplying food and 
drink warrant the fitness of their products for human consumption (Burr 
V. Sherwin· Williams Co., 42 Cal.2d 682, 695 f268 P.2d 10411 and cases 
cited) . 
'(Mayer v. Salazar, 84 Cal. 646, 649·650 [24 P. 597]; Lahay V. City 
Nat. Bank of Denver, 15 Colo. 339 [25 P. 704, 705, 22 Am.St.Rep. 407}; 
Watson v. Jones. 41 Fla. 24] [25 So. 678. 683]; Coolidge v. Rhodes, 199 
Ill. 24,32 [64 N.E. 10741; Tott v. Ouggan, 199 Iowa 238 [200 N. W. 
411]; Becker v. McKinnie, lOG Kan. 42n [186 P. 496]; Prewett v. Trimble, 
92 Ky. 176 [17 S.W. 3;,tl. :l5i, 3(i Am.St.Rep. !}80]; Braley v. Po leer., 
92 Me. 203 [42 A. 362, 364]; New England Foundation Co. v. Elliott 
4' Watrous, Inc., 3013 Mass 177,183 [27 N.E.2d 756]; Krause v. Cook, 
144 Mich. 365 [108 N.W. 81, 82); Ti.~cllrr v. Bardin, 155 Minn. 361 [194 
N.W. 3, 5J; Peterson v. Schaber", 116 Neb. 346 [217 N.W. 586, 587]; 
) 
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[3] The evidence in the present case does not justify the 
impositioll of the strict liability of a warranty. There was 
no express warranty agreement, and there is nothing in the 
evidence to indicate that defendant assumed responsibility 
for the accuracy of his statements. He did not, as did the 
defendant in Orawford v. Duncan, 61 Cal.App. 647, 650 
[215 P. 573], tender plaintiffs an "absolute promise" that the 
results of his test would be accurate. He was not a seller 
of property who obligated himself as part of his bargain 
to convey property in the condition represented. The amount 
of his fee and the fact that he was paid by the hour also 
indicate that he was selling service and not insurance. [4] Thus 
the general rule is applicable that those who sell their services 
for the guidance of others in their economic, financial, and 
personal affairs are not liable in the absence of negligence 
or intentional misconduct. 
THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DECEIT 
[6] To be actionable deceit, the representation need not 
be made with knowledge of actual falsity, but need only be 
an "assertion, as a fact. of that which is not true, by one 
who has no reasonable ground for believing it to be true" 
(Civ. Code, § 1710, subd. 24: Gonsalves v. Hodgson, 38 Ca1.2d 
91, 100 [237 P.2d 6561 : Hoffman v. Kirby, 136 Cal. 26. 29 r68 
Boocock v. Osmllr, 153 N.Y. 604, 609·610 [47 N.E. 923]; Jacquot v. 
Farmers' Straw Ga8 Producer Co., 140 Wash. 482 [249 P. 984, 986·987]; 
Palmllr v. Goldberg, 128 Wis. 103, 111 [107 N.W. 478]; Lehigh Zinc 4' 
Iron Co. v. Bamford, 150 U.S. 665. 673 [14 S.Ct. 219, 37 L.Ed. 1215]; 
Btein v. Treger, 182 F.2d 696, 699; see also Edwarc'la v. Bergi, 137 Cal. 
App. 369, 373 [30 P.2d 541] [vendor "presumed" to know the truth]; 
Harris v. Delco Products, Inc., 305 Mass. 362, 365·367 [25 N.E.2d 740); 
¥ Tattl v. Bates 118 N.C. 287 [24 S.E. 482, 483, 54 Am.St.Rep. 7191; 
".:. TntBt Co. of Norfolk v. Fletcher, 152 Va. 868 [148 S.E. 785, 788, 73 
A.L.R. 1111]; Civ. Code, ~ 1572 [2].) Whether this liability should be 
regarded as part of the law of warranty or as a form of deceit (see 
;. Williston," Liability For Hones' Misrepresentation," 24 Harv.L.Rev. 
f' 415; Bohlen, "M isreprestlntation as Deceit, N egligence, o~ Warranty," 
~. 42 Harv.L.Rev. 733) we need not now determine. If plaintiffs had alleged 
and proved facts that justify its imposition, a mislabelling of their cause 
of action would be immaterial. (Code Civ. Proc., ~~ 307. 426.) 
'Since the Legislature in this section of the Civil Code has made the 
cause of aetion for negligent misrepresentation a form of deceit, state-
ments in a number of cases, contrary to this section and the cases cited 
in the text, that scienter is an essential elellwnt of every cause of action 
for deceit are erroneous and are therefore disapproved. (See, for example. 
Podlasky v. Price, !!7 CaI.App.~d 151, 101 [196 P.2d 6081; Swasey v. 
dll L'Etanche, 17 Cal.App.2d 713,716·717 162 P.2d 7531; Palladine v. 
Imperial Valley Farm Lands A8sn., 61) Cal.App. 727, 742 [221) P. 2911; 
GrislL'old v . . 110rrison, :'53 Cal.App. 93, 101 [200 P. 62]; 8meLand v. Be.· 
~, 50 Cal.App. 565, 569 [196 P. 283}.) 
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P. 321] ; Daley v. Quick. 99 Cal. 179, 182 [33 P. 859] ; Lerner 
v. Riverside Citrus Assn., 115 Cal.App.2d 544, 547 [252 P.2d 
744] ; Wishnick v. Frye, 111 Cal.App.2d 926, 930 [245 P.2(1 
532] ; Morrell v. Clark, 106 Cal.App.2d 198, 201 [234 P.2d 
774] ; Graham v. Ellm<We, 135 Cal.App. 129, 132 [26 P.2d 
696]; Williams v. Spazier, 134 Cal.App. 340, 345-346 [25 
P.2d 851] ; Andrew v. Bankers ct Shippers Ins. Co., 101 Cal. 
App. 566, 575 [281 P. 1091J ; Rest., Torts § 552; see also Civ. 
Code, § 1572, subd. 2; Horrell v. Santa Pe Tank cf Tower Co., 
117 Cal.App.2d 114, 119 [254 P.2d 893]) and made "with 
intent to induce [the recipient] to alter his position to his 
injury or his risk .••• " (Civ. Code, § 170911 ; Gonsalves v. 
Hodgson, supra, 38 Ca1.2d 91,100; Hobarl v. Hobart Estate 
Co., 26 Cal.2d 412, 422 [159 P.2d 958]; Estate 01 Newhall, 
190 Cal. 709, 718 [214 P. 231, 28 A.L.R. 778]; Work v. 
Campbell, 164 Cal. 343, 347 [128 P. 943, 43 L.R.A.N.S. 581] ; 
Carlson V. Murphy, 8 Cal.App.2d 607,609-612 [47 P.2d 1100].) 
[6] Defendant's intent to induce plaintiffs to alter their 
position can be inferred from the fact tbat be made tbe repre-
sentation with knowledge that plaintiffs would act in re-
liance thereon. (Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 239 
[135 N.E. 275J ; see also International Products CO. V. Erie 
R. Co., 244 N.Y. 331, 339 [155 N.N. 662, 56 A.L.R. 1377].) 
The evidence discloses that defendant's statement was 
erroneous, that, as will be shown presently, defendant negli-
gently performed tbe fill test, that his statement was there-
fore made without reasonable ground for believing it to be 
true (see International Products Co. v. Erie R. Co., supra, 
244 N.Y. 331, 338), and that plaintiffs justifiably relied on 
his statement in purchasing the lots and in making their 
contracts for the erection of the building. 
Defendant contends, however, that even if his statement 
was erroneous, it was not a misrepresentation of fact, but 
was only a statement of opinion and thus cannot form the 
basis of an action for deceit. [7] Defendant drilled the boles, 
'Under this section of the Civil Code the intent required to prove a cause 
of action for deceit is an IDtent to IDduee action. AD" intent to deceive" 
is not an essential element of the cause of action, and statements ba a 
number of eases, contrary to this section and the eases eited in the text, 
that such an IDtent is an essential element of deceit are erroneous and are 
therefore disapproved. (See, for example, Cardooo V. Bank of America, 
1I6 Cal.App.2d 833, 837 (254 P.2d 949]; Hayter Y. Fulmor, 92 Cal.App. 
2d 392, 398 [206 P.2d 1101]: BOG& V. Bank of .dmerica, 51 Ca1.App.2d 
;'il/i, 598 £1!:li'i P.2d 620]: Griswo/d V. Morrison, supra, 53 Cal.App. 93, 
97; 8mB/and Y. llenlvick, Bllpra, 50 Ca1.App. 565, 569; Bod,1k'.. Y. 
DII7Illam, 10 Ca1.App. 690, 698 [103 P. 3(1).) 
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'·,ami'1I'd till' snil. 1I11.! toll) Billiet that III'> fill WHO; !'Ill.\' 
12-Hi inches ill dppth. He' did not. give hiR statement in 
the form of an opinion but as a representation of fact. (See 
Edward Ban'on Estate Co. v. Woodruff Co., 163 Cal. 561, 573 
[126 P. 351, 42 L.R.A.N.S. 125]; Bla·ckman v. Howes, 82 
Cal.App.2d 275, 281 [185 P.2d 1019, 174 A.L.R. 1004]; 
Ha:;erot v. Keller, 67 Cal.App. 659, 670-671 [228 P. 383]; 
Palladine v. Imperial Valley Farm Lands Assn., 65 Cal.App. 
727, 737-739 [225 P. 291].) His assertion was not a casual 
expression of belief, but was a deliberate affirmation of the 
matters stated and was thus within the statute, which requires 
only that he assert, "as a fact, ... that which is not true . 
• • . " [Italics added.} (Civ. Code, § 1710, subd. 2.) 
[8] Moreover, even if defendant's statement was an opin-
ion, plaintiffs justifiably relied thereon. Defendant held 
himself out as an expert, plaintiffs hired him to supply in-
formation cQncerning matters of which they were ignorant, 
and his unequivocal statement necessarily implied that he 
knew facts that justified his statement. (Seeger v. Odell, 18 
Cal.2d 409, 414 [115 P.2d 977, 136 A.L.R. 1291]; Union 
FWwer Market, Ltd. v. Southern Cal. Flower Market, Inc., 
10 Cal.2d 671, 676 [76 P.2d 503] ; Harris V. Miller, 196 Cal. 8, 
13 [235 P. 981] ; Herdan v. Hanson, 182 Cal. 538. 546 [189 
P. 440]; Tracy v. Smith, 175 Cal. 161, 165 [165 P. 535]; 
Sime v. MaJ.ou/, 95 Cal.App.2d 82, 101 [212 P.2d 946. 213 i 
P.2d 788] ; Eade v. Reich, 120 Cal.App. 32, 35 [7 P.2d 1043] ; 
Raserol v. Keller, supra, 67 Cal.App. 659, 670.) The cause 
of action for deceit was therefore established by the evidence. 
THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOB NEGLIGENCE 
[9] The services of experts are sought because of their 
t special skill. They have a duty to exercise the ordinary skill r and competence of members of their profession, and a failure 
~ to discharge that duty will subject them to liability for 
f negligence. Those who hire such persons are not justified 
.f in expecting infallibility, but can expect only reasonable care ;:-:, 
;. and competence. They purchase service, not insurance. 
(PerkiN v. Trueblood, 180 Cal. 437, 441 [181 P. 6421 [physi-
cian] ; Speer v. Brown, 26 Cal.App.2d 283. 288, 294 [79 P.2d 
179] [physician]; Sim v. Weeks,7 Cal.App.2d 28. 33 [45 P.2d 
350] [physician]; Walter v. England, 133 Cal.App. 676. 679 
[24 P.2d 930) [dentist]; Page v. Wells, 37 Mich. 415. 421 
[timber appraiser] ; Edwa.rds v. Lamb. 69 N.H. 599 [45 A. 480. 
50 L.R.A. 160} [physician]; Skilling, v. Allen, 143 MinD. 
) 
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:123 f173 N.Y. 663, 5 A.L.R. 922J I physician] ; Noble v. 
'fibhy. 114 Wis. Ga2, 6:H f12!l N.W. 7911 [timber appraiser).) 
[10] Defendant '8 duty of care in prrforming the soH test 
was established by his contract with plaintiffs. His failure 
to diseharge that duty was established by the testimony of 
his employee that the employee noticed evidence of fill 4-5 
feet below the surface, as well as by the testimony of the 
persons who dug the foundation trenches. This testimony 
indicates that had defendant made his test with due care, 
he would have discovered the true extent of the fill, and it 
supports the inference that defendant made his test in a 
careless and negligent manner. Defendant's repeated asser-
tion that he was not qualified to test soil for fill, contrary to 
the finding that he so held himself out, and the testimony 
of his expert witness that laboratory tests were necessary, 
also indicate that defendant did not exercise the ordinary 
skill and competence of those in the business of soil testing. 
His failure to do so, as found by the trial court, supports 
the cause of action for negligence. 
THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES 
The only question remaining is the measure of damages 
to be applied. [11] Plaintiffs contend that the trial court 
correctly measured the damages by the difference between 
the actual cost of the foundation and what it would have 
cost had defendant's representations been true. This measure 
would have been a proper one had defendant undertaken to 
insure that the lots had no fill beyond 12-16 inches in depth. 
As indicated above, however, defendant's undertaking was 
limited to exercising due care to determine and report the 
extent of the fill, and the damages, whether for deceit or 
negligence. must be measured by the actual losses suffered 
because of the misrepresentation. (Civ. Code, §§ 1709, 3333; 
see also Edward Barron Estate 00. v. W oodruf! 00., 163 Cal. 
561, 577-578 [126 P. 351, 42 L.R.A.N.S. 125] ; McCormick on 
Damages [1935], p. 449.) 
[12] In reliance on defendant's information plaintiffs pur-
chased the property. If the property was worth less than 
they paid for it. defendant is liable for the difference.1I On 
"On a retrial of this eause, plaintiffs can amend their complaint to 
allege gueh damages and produce evidenee to establish the allegation. 
They are also entitled to reeover any consequential damages resuiting from 
the purchase of the lots in reliance on defendant's misrepresentations. 
(See Bagda..arian v. Gragnon, 31 Cal.2d 744, 762-763 [192 P.2d 935]; 
EdIL"ard Barron Estate Co. v. Woodruff Co., 163 Cal. 561, 577-578 [126 
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the other hand. if the lots were worth what plaintiffs paid 
for them. plaintiffs were not damaged by their purchase. for 
even though they \votdd not have bought the lots bad they 
known the truth. they nevertheless received property as valu· 
able as that with which they parted. 
[13] Plaintiffs also undertook to build on the property 
before they discovered the extent of the fill. At the time 
they discovered the truth. they were 80 far committed to 
their building project that it would be unreasonable to require 
them to terminate it to mitigate damages. (Bomberger v. 
McKelvey, 35 Cal.2d 607. 614 [220 P.2d 729] ; see also Rest.. I 
Contracts. § 336. comment a.) 
[14] The additional costs plaintiffs incurred in the in-
stallation of the foundation were not caused by defendant's 
misinformation. bowever, but by the physical condition of 
the land. The true condition was discovered in time to alter 
the plans. and it does not appear that plaintiffs had to 
abandon any of their work or to undo any of it and start 
over. Thus this is not a case in which plaintiffs wholly or 
partially completed their building before they discovered the 
truth and thereafter had to abandon it or make costly altera-
tions that would not have been required had they known the 
true condition of their land at the outset of construction. 
Such damages. had they been suffered, would have resulted 
direCtly from defendant's failure to report the truth and 
would clearly be recoverable. In the present case, plaintiffs 
have proved only that they were induced to commit them-
selves to a building venture and that the cost of the building 
exceeded the anticipated cost by $3,093.65. Given the deci· 
sion to build, however, these costs would have been incurred 
whether or not defendant correctly reported the extent of 
the fill, and the question presented is. therefore, whether or 
not plaintiffs have proved that they suffered damage as a 
result of being induced to build on their property. This 
question is basically the same as the question whether or not 
they proved that they suffererl damage as a result of being 
induced to buy the lots in the first instance. 
It may be assumed that lots with 3 to 6 feet of fill would 
not be as valuable as ones identical in other respects with 
only 12 to 16 inches of fill. Accordingly, by proving that 
the fi11 was deeper than defendant had reported. plaintiffs 
established that they wt're induced to buy lots that were 
. less valuable than they had anticipated. As stated above. 
, however, since they did not prove that the lots were worth 
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'111' ('xtr;! ,·,,·,1 I .. d"r.·"dllllb; in tl .. llat·!-; 1\1111 "('nll' ;"'isillg' rrlllll 
the fact that IIIP ('IlIHiit ion of thp Icmd wa~ 1I0t. as rl'prl's('nlrd 
by defendant that plaintiffs seek to recover. I eallnot agree 
that defendant did not .. cause" plaintiffs to incur tlles!' 
additional expenses so as to render defendant liable therefor. 
If defendant had truly reported the condition of the land 
plaintiffs would not have purchased it at all. 
According to the theory of the majority opinion if plaintiffs 
in reliance on defendant's representation had constructed the 
building without discovering the truth as to the condition 
of the land and if the building, by reason of foundations 
inadequate because of the unreported depth of the fill, had 
collapsed, plaintiffs could not recover from defendant the cost 
of rebuilding or any other sum unless the bare land on the 
day it was purchased was worth less than the sum paid for 
it, and such difference, if any, would be the exclusive measure 
of damages. 
Beeause of defendant's misrepresentation plaintiffs pur-
chased the lots, entered into an agreement to pay $3,121.40 
for the construction of a foundation, pltts additional charges 
if unforeseen conditions such as the existence of a fill deeper 
than 16 inches required extra work, and entered into contracts 
for the construction of a building and for a loan to finance 
the construction. In constructing the foundation the con-
tractor did encounter the unforeseen condition of the deeper 
fill and as a result plaintiffs incurred additional expenses 
of $3,093.65. Whatever the actual value of the land was at 
the time of purchase and whatever the selling price eventually 
may be, it is indisputably true that plaintiffs are actually 
"out of pocket" the sum of $3,093.65 more as the cost of the 
improved property than they would have been if defendant's 
representation had been true. In my opinion defendant's 
representation should be held to constitute a proximate, legal 
cause of plaintiffs' additional cost; in the language of section 
3333 the additional cost was "detriment proximately caused 
thereby"; the extra eost would not have been incurred if 
defendant had not made the false representation. 
The effect of the majority opinion is to limit plaintiffs' 
recovery to an artificially limited so-called "out-of-pocket" 
loss (see Civ. Code, § 3343). In Bagdasarian v. (kagnon 
(1948), 31 Ca1.2d 744, 759, 762 [192 P.2d 935J, a majority 
of this court held that the artificially limited and inaccurately 
designated "out-of-pocket" measure of damages provided for 
in section 3343 of the Civil Code and made available to one 
I 
f 
If'SS than they paiJ for them, they failed to establish damagl's 
flowing from their drci!'lion to bt,y. Similarly, if despite tilt> 
additional cost, plaintiffs secured a building that was ,yorth 
as much or more than it reasonably cost them to erect. no 
damages flowed from their decision to build. Plaintiffs did 
not prove that the extent of the fill made the lots unsuitabl!' 
for their intended use, or that because of it. the reasonable 
cost of their building exceeded its value, and they success· 
fully prevented defendant from introducing evidence that 
the value of the property as improved exceeded the amount 
plaintiffs invested in it. After plaintiffs purchased the lots 
they owned property that was suitable for the nse they in· 
tended to make of it. Because of defendant's negligenc(> 
plaintiffs erroneously believed that it was more suitable for 
their purpose than it actually was. '{'he additional expense 
they incurred, however, flowed from the condition of thf'il' 
land and not from defendant's report as to what that con· 
dition was. Thus, although they would not have undertaken 
to build had they known the truth, they have not proved 
any losses flowing from that decision. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Spence, J., and Bray, J. pro tern.,· 
concurred. 
SCHAUER, J.-J do not agree with that portion of the 
majority opinion which discusses the measure of damages for 
defendant's wrong. As indicated in the majority opinion. 
the Civil Code (§ 3333) prescribes the measure of damages. 
Section 3333. which applies both to an action for negligence 
and to one for deceit. provides: "For the breach of an 
obligation not arising from contract, the measure of damages, 
except where otherwise expressly provided by this code. is 
the amount which will compensate for all the detriment proxi· 
mately caused thereby, whether it could have been anticipated 
or not." 
According to the majority opinion, the additional costs 
incurred by plaintiffs because the land was filled to a dept h 
of 3 to 6 feet, rather than to a depth of 12 to 16 inches HS 
reported by defendant. "were not caused by defendant's mi;;· 
information ... but by the physical condit.ion of the lan(]" 
BlIt the sole object of the employment of dpfpnilullt by plaill' 
tiffs was to ascertain the comlition of the land and it is only 
• Alisiarned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
OAGNE v. BERTRAN [43 C.2d 
dt'fra'HI<>cl in tJIP. purehaRe, sal<\ or cxehnnge of property, is 
the exclusive, rather thall, at th<.' option of the wronged perRon, 
an alternafille. measure of dalllages in such a case. Although 
1 do not agree with this holding (see my dissent in the 
Ba/!dasarian case, p. 764 of 31 Cal.2d), I recognize it as 
currently the law of this state. But I cannot approve the 
extension of the rule so limiting damages for the benefit of 
fraudulent vendors to include in the class of favored persons l 
a person such as defendant here who is not by the terms of 
the statute within the class. Defendant here is not the fraud-
ulent seller or buyer of property, but one who was employed 
as an expert soil engineer or "test driller" to render skilled 
personal services: i. e., to do whatever was necessary to ascer-
tain and inform plaintiffs of the true condition as to the 
extent of any fill on the property so that they might intelli-
gently and accurately compute the cost of improving it and, 
accordingly, determine whether they would buy it and, if so, 
how they would improve it. 
The measure of responsibility of defendant for the negligent 
performance of his obligation and for the false representation 
as to the condition of the thing he was employed to ascertain 
and report on should certainly be no less than that. for ex-
ample, of a member of the legal profession who is employed 
to examine and report on the condition of title to land pro-
posed to be purchased or accepted as security for a loan. If 
the lawyer is incompetent, performs his work in a negligent 
manner, and reports a false condition when the true condition 
would have been discovered and reported by a competent 
lawyer exercising ordinary care, and, as a consequence. the 
cHent purchases the property or loans on its security and 
'llubsequently finds that the title is already encumbered, is 
the client to be denied recovery because (paraphrasing the 
language of the majority opinion) ,. the loss he incurred 
flowed from the condition of the title to the land and not from 
defendant's report as to what that condition was'" As hete-
inafter shown, the cases establish that the rule is to the 
contrary_ 
It is so well established as to need no citation of authority 
'It is to be presumed that the Legislature by enacting Civil Code, see· 
tion 3343, intend I'd to provide further (I\nd alternative) protection for 
the wronged victim of fraud, but by the judicial interpolation in the 
Bngrlasarian case which reads into the statute a provision that it shall be 
the exclusive remedy in cases of fraud, tbe court has made a shield for 
the wrongdoer out of what was inteuded IlS a aword' for the victim. (See 
also 5 Williston on COlltracts (rev. ed.) t 1392, p. 3886.) 
) 
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that persons who undertake as experts to perform personal 
skilled services and who. either because they do not possess 
the skill they claim, or because of negligence. fail to perform 
in the manner and with the results that would attend per· 
formance with due care by a person of ordinary skill. may 
bE' sued either for breach of contract or for negligence, or 
where there is actual or constructive fraud, for such fraud. 
A nd where the action is ex delicto, exemplary damages may 
be recovered upon a showing of frand even though the tort 
incidentally involves a breach of contract (Civ. Code, § 3294; 
Chelini v. Nieri (1948). 32 Ca1.2d 480. 486 [196 P.2d 915] ; 
Haigler v. Donnelly (1941), 18 Ca1.2d 674, 680 [117 P.2d 
331 J ). Furthermore, it is to be noted that Civil Code, section 
3343. relied upon by the majority in the Bagdasarian case, 
expressly provides that "Nothing herein [in § 3343] con-
tained shall be deemed to deny to any person having a cause 
of action for fraud or deceit any legal or equitable remedies 
to which such person may be entitled. " 
An attorney employed to examine the title to real property 
must exercise reasonable care and skill in the matter, and 
his failure to do so is negligence for which he will be liable 
to his client in damages for the loss occasioned. (5 Am.Jur. 
338, § 132.) The measure of damages due from an attorney 
to his client for negligence in' passing as clear a title encum-
bered with liens is the amount necessary to payoff the liens, 
and this is true regardless of whether the client later sells 
the property for a profit. The Supreme Court of New Jersey 
states the rule as follows (Jacobsen v. Peterson (1918), 91 
N.J.L.404 [103 A. 983, 9841): "The question arises, What 
was the measure of damages? Where, as here, an attorney 
negligently omits to report the fact of a judgment. which is 
a lien upon real estate the title of which he was employed 
to investigate. and his client purchases such real estate in 
reliance upon such report and without knowledge of such 
judgment, the measure of damages is the amount his client 
is caused to payout to remove the lien of such judgment. 
But it appeared that the plaintiff subsequently sold the real 
estate for a sum in excess of its total cost to him, including 
the discharge of the judgment, and the trial judge considered 
this justified the award of nominal damages only. Not so. 
The measure of damages was not affected by the sale. It will 
not do to say that in order for a client to recover for such 
; negligence he must either sell the property at a loss or not 
t .. 
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sell it at all, He was entitled to all the profit he would have 
made by the transaction if the title had been as represented." 
(See aI~o Annotation, 5 A.L.R. 1389, 1394-1395, "Liability of 
attorney passing defective title. . .• Measure of damages.") 
Here, the condition of the land as to the fill was just as 
important to the plaintiffs as was its condition as to title; 
if they had bp.en compelled to payoff a judgment lien of 
$3,093.65 they would have been no more out of pocket than 
they were by reason of having to pay the same sum for the 
deeper foundations required by the deeper flll. 
The code does not require, and, as shown above, the case law 
does not suggest, that damages recoverable for deceit or 
negligence from one such as the defendant here who under-
takes to perform personal skilled services be limited to the 
difference, if any, by which the market value of the land at 
the time of purchase is less than the price paid for it. Here 
the plaintiffs are actually out of pocket the entire $3,093.65 
which they were required to pay over and above the basic 
contract price because defendant's representation was not 
true. Certainly to plaintiffs the amount of the detriment 
which they suffered as a result of defendant's wrong is the 
additional amount they were compelled to expend to obtain 
what both plaintiffs and defendant had contemplated they 
should obtain. I would, therefore. affirm the judgment. 
SHENK., Acting C. J .-1 dissent. 1 would affirm the judg-
ment on the ground that under the facts of this case the 
detriment suffered by the plaintiffs is, as stated by Mr. Justice 
Schauer in his dissent, "the additional amount they were 
compelled to expend to obtain what both plaintiffs and 
defendant had contemplated they should obtain." 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied November 
17, 1954. Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. 
